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using	 data	 from	 Vietnam.	 The	 paper	 takes	 an	 advantage	 of	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
compulsory	primary	schooling	reform	that	was	introduced	in	Vietnam	in	1991	to	instrument	
for	exogenous	variations	 in	years	of	 schooling	 to	surmount	 the	endogeneity	problem	as	a	
primary	 threat	 to	 idenfication	 facing	 the	 causal	 effect	 estimation.	 The	 paper	 finds	 that	
education	 is	positively	 associated	with	non-wage	benefits.	 In	particular,	 the	baseline	2SLS	
estimates	indicates	that	one	additional	year	of	schooling	is	causally	linked	to	a	6	percentage	
point	 increase	 in	 the	 likelihood	of	 receiving	monetary	payments	 for	public	holidays,	 a	4.6	
percentage	point	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	receiving	monetary	employee	benefits,	a	7.3	
percentage	point	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	having	annual	paid	leave	and	a	6.8	percentage	
point	 increase	 in	 the	 likelihood	 of	 having	 firm-provided	 social	 insurance.	 The	 baseline	
estimates	are	strongly	robust	to	the	estimates	from	some	robustness	checks.	The	paper	also	
inspects	 that	 the	 causal	 associations	 between	 schooling	 and	 formal	 employment,	 skilled	
























vital	 role	 as	workers’	 social	 protections	 in	 the	workplace	 from	 the	 vulnerability	 stemming	
from	 both	 internal	 and	 external	 shocks.	 Therefore,	 understanding	 non-wage	 benefits	 is	




















Specifically,	 informal	 firms	 do	 typically	 not	 attach	 non-wage	 benefits	 to	 a	 paid	 job’s	
compensation	package	(McCaig	and	Pavcnik	2015).	There	are	some	reasons	for	this	stylized	






wage	benefits	 rather	than	comparatively	 low	salaries.	 It	 is	suggestive	of	being	that	almost	




securities,	 social	 and	 health	 protections	 provided	 by	 firms	 (Mannila	 2015).	 The	 reality	 of	







markets	 in	 this	 transition	 economy.	General	 speaking,	 before	1986	Vietnam	had	no	 labor	
markets	because	its	economy	worked	as	a	centrally	planned	system.	Under	such	an	economy,	
all	allocations	related	to	employment	such	as	the	volume	of	jobs,	the	amount	of	workers	or	
wage	 were	 dominantly	 decided	 by	 the	 central	 state.	 In	 contrast,	 in	 the	 era	 of	 economic	
renovation	 Vietnam	 has	 initiated	 and	 developed	 its	 labor	 markets	 where	 there	 are	 the	
interactive	functionings	of	the	demand	for	and	the	supply	of	labor	in	some	extent	to	allocate	
human	resources	in	the	economy.	
However,	 it	 is	 reasonably	admitted	 that	Vietnam	has	 so	 far	 a	weakly	 institutionalized	
labor	 market	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 labor	 market	 institutions	 and	 policies	 are	 inefficiently	
functioned	and	 insufficiently	 implemented	as	well	 (Schmillen	and	Packard	2016)	 and	 thus	






various	 educational	 outcomes	 is	 hypothetically	 revealed	 more	 apparently	 (Schmillen	 and	
Packard	2016).	
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market	 outcomes	 is	 that	 schooling	 is	 likely	 connected	 with	 many	 latent	 personal	











education	 on	 non-wage	 benefits	 are	 discovered	 by	 using	 OLS,	 2SLS	 and	 reduced-form	
estimators.	In	particular,	the	baseline	OLS	estimates	show	that	workers	going	to	schools	for	
one	more	year	are	more	likely	to	gain	non-wage	benefits,	specifically	monetary	payments	for	
public	 holidays	 by	 4.4	 percentage	 points,	monetary	 employee	 benefits	 by	 2.6	 percentage	
points,	annual	paid	leave	by	6.6	percentage	points	and	firm-provided	social	insurance	by	6.5	
percentage	points	compared	to	the	counterparts.	The	baseline	2SLS	estimates	indicate	that	
an	 additional	 year	 of	 schooling	 is	 causally	 linked	 to	 a	 6	 percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	





than	 those	 who	 were	 out	 of	 the	 reform,	 in	 particular	 for	 monetary	 payments	 for	 public	
holidays	by	11.4	percentage	points,	monetary	employee	benefits	by	8.8	percentage	points,	
annual	 paid	 leave	 by	 13.8	 percentage	 points	 and	 firm-provided	 social	 insurance	 by	 13	
percentage	points.	Interestingly,	it	is	obvious	that	the	impact	of	schooling	is	larger	for	fringe	
																																																						




(non-monetary	 non-wage)	 benefits	 than	 monetary	 non-wage	 benefits	 by	 using	 all	 three	
estimation	models.		
This	 paper	 furthermore	 inspects	 several	 essential	 channels	 through	 which	 schooling	
might	effects	the	probability	to	gain	non-wage	benefits	in	the	workplace.	One	likelihood	is	
more	 education	 increases	 the	 chance	 for	 working	 in	 the	 formal	 sector	 rather	 than	 the	
informal	 sector.	Workers	working	with	a	 formal	employment	 tend	 to	earn	 improved	non-
wage	 compensation.	 Another	 possible	 factor	 is	 that	 acquiring	 more	 schooling	 give	 more	
likelihoods	for	workers	to	achive	a	skilled	occupation	that	in	turn	enables	them	more	likely	to	
obtain	non-wage	compensation.	Finally,	the	possibility	to	working	for	an	employee-friendly	
firm	might	 be	higher	 for	 the	more	 educated	workers.	Workers	working	 for	 an	 employee-
friendly	firm	probably	are	more	likely	to	gain	non-wage	compensation.		
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	describes	the	Vietnamese	
compulsory	 schooling	 reform	 and	 previous	 literature	 related	 to	 returns	 to	 schooling	 in	
















In	 1986,	 the	 government	 of	 Vietnam	 launched	 an	 economic	 reform	 that	 is	 called	
renovation	under	the	name	of	Đổi	Mới	in	Vietnamese.	In	line	with	the	policies	for	reforming	
its	economy,	Vietnam	has	attempted	to	transform	its	educational	system	with	many	policies	
as	 efforts	 to	 enhance	 the	 nation’s	 human	 capital	 stock	 for	 economic	 growth	 and	 the	
transformation	 of	 the	 whole	 economy	 (Kinh	 and	 Chi	 2008).	 One	 of	 the	 most	 important	
educational	policies	is	the	compulsory	primary	schooling	reform	for	all	Vietnamese	children	




the	 fifth	 grade.	 In	other	words,	 15	 years	old	became	 the	maximum	age	 for	 freely	 leaving	






Before	 this	 reform,	 Vietnam	 had	 no	 any	 year	 of	 compulsory	 schooling.	 Chidren’s	







created	 to	 increase	 educational	 attainment	 among	 Vietnamese	 citizens.	 Illustratively,	 the	






















has	 considerable	 positive	 impacts	 on	 labor	 market	 earnings	 in	 Vietnam	 with	 modified	
Mincerian	 equations	 and	 a	 OLS	 estimator.	 However,	 such	 studies	 that	 merely	 used	 a	
conventional	Mincerian	equation	and	its	augmented	equations	with	a	naive	OLS	estimator	for	
the	 estimation	 could	 not	 produce	 unbised	 estimates	 because	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	
endogeneity	 problem.	 Ignoring	 the	 endogeneity	 problem	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
education	 and	 schooling	 is	 a	 very	 extreme	disadvantage	 in	providing	precise	 estimates	of	
private	benefits	of	schooling.	It	is	vastly	challenge	to	use	such	estimates	to	inform	the	causal	
impact	of	education	on	labor	market	outcomes.		









the	 same	 group	 with	 similar	 characteristics	 such	 as	 age,	 gender,	 cohort	 and	 location	 to	
instrument	 for	exogenous	changes	 in	a	 respondent’s	educational	outcome.	They	 find	 that	
education	 plays	 a	 substantial	 role	 in	 improving	 consumption	 expenditure	 for	 Vietnamese	
families.			
Oostendorp	 and	 Doan	 (2013)	 strive	 to	 examine	 not	 only	 wage	 but	 also	 employment	
effects	of	schooling	and	find	the	positive	impacts	of	schooling	on	labor	market	outcomes	in	




















health,	 employment,	 household	 expenditure,	 household	 assets,	 housing	 and	 agricultural	
































analysis	has	7,865	observation	 in	 the	size	with	a	 treatment	group	of	4,694	workers	and	a	
control	 group	 of	 3,171	 workers.	 In	 terms	 of	 basic	 socio-demographic	 characteristics,	 the	
average	age	of	the	whole	sample	is	nearly	34	years	old	while	corresponding	figures	for	the	






Year	Festival	 (the	Tet	holiday),	Hung	King’s	Anniversary	Day	 (March	10	of	 the	Lunar	Year),	Reunification	Day	
(April	30),	International	Labor	Day	(May	1)	and	National	Day	(September	2).		
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Referring	 non-wage	 compensation	 outcomes,	 around	 71	 percent	 workers	 receives	
monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	for	the	whole	sample.	The	corresponding	firgures	for	

















"#$#%&'( = *+ +	*./0ℎ223&$45#67( + *89′( + ;< + =( 																								(1)	
where	"#$#%&'( 	is	a	non-wage	benefit	measured	by	four	distinct	variables	(the	probability	of	
monetary	 payments	 for	 public	 holidays,	 the	 probability	 of	 having	 monetary	 employee	
benefits,	the	probability	of	receiving	an	annual	paid	leave,	and	the	probability	of	having	firm-











markets	 over	 several	 decades	 (Card	 2001).	 Recent	 studies	 has	 employed	 compulsory	
schooling	reforms	as	a	contemporarily	fashionable	approach	to	instrument	for	exogeneous	
shifts	 in	 educational	 outcome	 to	 estimate	 the	 causal	 effect	 of	 schooling	 on	 labor	market	
outcomes	 (Devereux	 and	 Hart	 2010;	 Grenet	 2013;	 Oreopoulos	 2006;	 Pischke	 and	 von	
Wächter	2008;	Stephens	and	Yang	2014).		
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the	 impact	 of	 schooling	 on	 non-wage	 benefits	 for	 Vietnamese	 workers.	 Let	 denote	?#%27@ABC2DE7#( 	 as	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 exposed	 to	 the	 reform	 for	 a	 worker	 &,	
mathematically		
?#%27@ABC2DE7#( = = 1	if	"&7'ℎ5#67( ≥ 1977= 0																					2'ℎ#7M&D# 																												(1)	
where	"&7'ℎ5#67( 	is	the	year	of	birth	of	the	worker	&.		
The	variable	of	?#%27@ABC2DE7#( 	 is	used	 to	predict	 schooling	years	 in	 the	 following	
two-equation	system	with	a	two-stage	least-squares	(2SLS)	estimation	procedure.	The	first	
and	second	stages	estimate	the	corresponding	following	regression	functions:	
/0ℎ223&$45#67( = N+ +	N.?#%27@ABC2DE7#( + N89′( + ;< + O( 																(2)	
and		
"#$#%&'( = >+ +	>./0ℎ223P$45#67Q + >89′( + ;< + R( 																										(3)	
where	/0ℎ223P$45#67Q	 in	equation	(3)	 is	the	predicted	value	of	/0ℎ223&$45#67( 	 from	the	




1991	 schooling	 reform	 on	 non-wage	 compensation	 outcomes.	 In	 particular,	 the	 paper	
estimates	the	following	equation:		




Next,	 the	 paper	 reports	 the	 baseline	 results	 for	 the	 impact	 of	 education	 on	 non-wage	
compensation.	 This	 paper	 first	 explores	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 schooling	 reform	 on	 years	 of	
schooling	 (first-stage	 regression)	 and	 non-wage	 compensation	 outcomes	 (reduced-form	












probability	 of	 having	 annual	 paid	 leave	 (column	 3),	 and	 the	 probability	 of	 having	 a	 firm-
provided	social	insurance	(column	4).	For	each	non-wage	compensation	outcome,	the	paper	




observations.	 For	 each	 baseline	 specification,	 the	 set	 of	 control	 variables	 consists	 of	 age,	
squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	and	married;	and	survey	year	 fixed	effects	 is	are	also	
included.	 Generally,	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 indicate	 that	 education	 has	 a	 significant	
positive	 relationship	with	non-wage	benefits	 for	 all	 four	outcomes	using	 three	estimation	
models.	All	estimated	coefficients	are	statistically	significant	at	1%.		
The	OLS	estimates	 in	Panel	A	of	Table	2	point	out	that	 there	 is	a	significant	 favorable	
connection	 between	 education	 and	 all	 four	 non-wage	 compensation	 measures	 in	 the	
Vietnamese	 workplace.	 Each	 extra	 year	 of	 schooling	 on	 average	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 4.4	
percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	 probability	 of	 receiving	 monetary	 payments	 for	 public	
holidays	(column	1),	a	2.6	percentage	point	increase	in	the	probability	of	receiving	monetary	






are	 correlated	 with	 both	 education	 and	 non-wage	 compensation	 outcome?	 Despite	 the	
	 19	
unobservable	factors	related	to	various	survey	years	are	controlled	in	the	estimation	model,	




the	 available	 set	 of	 control	 variables	using	 in	OLS	model	 can	not	 satisfactorily	 provide	 an	
acceptable	approach	to	the	endogeneity	problems.	Therefore,	these	OLS	estimates	are	not	
reliably	suggestive	of	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation.	






changes,	 well-trained	 teachers	 or	 financial	 assistance.	 The	 results	 of	 2SLS	 estimates	 are	
presented	in	Panel	B	of	Table	2.		
The	 first-stage	estimates	 indicate	 that	 the	 reform	has	a	 significant	positive	 impact	on	
years	 of	 schooling.	 In	 particular,	 exposure	 to	 the	 reform	more	 likely	 increases	 a	worker’s	
education	by	about	1.9	years	of	schooling.	Equally	importantly,	the	F-statistics	of	the	excluded	
instrument	 in	 the	 first-stage	 is	 approximately	 76.06,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 reform	 is	
satisfactorily	associated	with	schooling	years	the	endogenous	variable	in	this	study	(Staiger	
and	Stock	1997).	The	significant	positive	link	between	the	reform	and	educational	outcome	













significantly	 rises	 non-wage	 compensation,	 in	 particular	 monetary	 payments	 for	 public	
holidays,	monetary	employee	benefits,	annual	paid	leave	and	firm-provided	social	insurance.		
It	is	also	absorbing	to	mention	that	the	2SLS	estimates	are	larger	than	the	corresponding	




for	 monetary	 employee	 benefits,	 0.7	 percentage	 points	 for	 annual	 paid	 leave	 and	 0.3	
percentage	points	for	firm-provided	social	insurance.		
In	 addition	 to	 presenting	 the	 OLS	 and	 2SLS	 estimates,	 this	 paper	 also	 discusses	 the	
reduced-form	estimates	of	the	impact	of	exposure	to	the	reform	on	non-wage	compensation.	
This	 allows	 us	 to	 varify	 if	 exposure	 to	 the	 reform	 validly	 affects	 non-wage	 benefits.	 	 The	
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implements	 three	 checks	 for	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 baseline	 estimates	 by	 (i)	 estimating	 other	
various	specifications	that	are	different	from	the	baseline	specification	by	changing	the	set	of	
control	variables,	(ii)	estimating	the	baseline	specification	using	various	sub-samples	created	
















Specifically,	 the	OLS	 estimates	 in	 Panel	 A	 of	 Table	 3	 show	 that	 an	 additional	 year	 of	
schooling	is	more	likely	to	link	to	a	4.8	(column	1)	or	4.4	percentage	points	(column	2)	increase	
in	the	probability	of	receiving	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays,	a	3	(column	1)	or	2.7	










is	 roughly	1.68	 years	of	 schooling	 for	parsimony	 specification	 (column	1)	or	 1.71	 years	of	
schooling	 for	 full	 specification	 (column	2).	 For	 the	 second-stage	 results,	one	more	year	of	
schooling	 causally	 rises	 the	 probability	 of	 non-wage	 benefits,	 in	 particular	 monetary	
payments	 for	 public	 holidays	 by	 about	 6	 or	 6.1	 percentage	 points,	 monetary	 employee	
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benefits	by	roughly	4.7	or	4.8	percentage	points,	annual	paid	leave	by	approximately	7.2	or	












Secondly,	 Table	 4	 reports	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 using	different	 bandwidth	 choices	 to	
create	corresponding	sub-samples,	including	(i)	1969–1984	birth	years	(6,974	observations),	
(ii)	 1970–1983	 birth	 years	 (6,038	 observations),	 (iii)	 1971–1982	 birth	 years	 (5,032	
observations),	and	 (iv)	1972–1981	birth	years	 (4,071	observations).	The	paper	also	 finds	a	
significant	and	positive	relationship	between	schooling	years	and	non-wage	benefits	using	all	
specifications	for	all	sub-samples.	These	estimates	still	keep	their	statistical	significances	at	







benefits	 (column	2),	0.67	percentage	points	 for	annual	paid	 leave	 (column	3)	and	6.6–6.7	
percentage	points	(column	4).		
The	 2SLS	 estimates	 from	 Panel	 B	 of	 Table	 4	 also	 show	 the	 strong	 robust	 impact	 of	
schooling	on	non-wage	compensation	comparable	 to	 the	baseline	2SLS	estimates.	For	 the	
first-stage,	exposure	to	the	reform	increases	education	by	1.42–1.8	years	of	schooling	with	
the	F-statistics	on	excluded	instrument	of	between	59.79–71.47.	When	we	narrow	the	sample	
with	 a	 smaller	 bandwidth,	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 first-stage	 estimate	 is	 relatively	 lower	




the	 cutoff.	 The	 second-stage	 estimates	 indicate	 that	 one	more	 year	 of	 schooling	 causally	
increases	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	by	5.4–6.2	percentage	points	(column	1),	
monetary	employee	benefits	by	2.9–4.6	percentage	points	(column	2),	annual	paid	leave	by	
6.4–7.6	 percentage	 points	 (column	 3)	 and	 firm-provided	 social	 insurance	 by	 6.1–7.1	
percentage	points	(column	4).	





















impacts.	 The	 positive	 impacts	 for	 all	 outcomes	 of	 non-wage	 benefits	 using	 available	
estimation	models	are	established	with	a	1%	statistical	significance	level.	The	OLS	estimates	
in	Panel	A	of	Table	5	illustrate	that	workers	who	have	an	additional	year	of	schooling	are	on	
average	4.6	percentage	points	more	 likely	 to	 gain	monetary	payments	 for	public	holidays	




















annual	 paid	 leave	 by	 approximately	 14.2	 percentage	 points	 (column	 3)	 and	 a	 higher	
probability	to	have	firm-provided	social	insurance	by	roughly	13.3	percentage	points	(column	
4).		











non-wage	 benefits.	 Table	 6	 domonstrates	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 of	 the	 impacts	 of	
schooling	on	three	mediating	factors.	Overall,	the	estimates	from	Table	6	show	that	education	
has	statistically	significant	and	positive	impacts	on	mediating	factors	measured	in	percentage	
points,	 in	 particular	 formal	 employment	 (column	 1),	 skilled	 occupation	 (column	 2)	 and	





a	 weakly	 institutionalized	 system	 with	 imperfect	 functionings	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
defective	implementation	and	compliance	of	labor	market	institutions	and	policies	(Schmillen	





labor	market	 imperfections	such	insufficient	 legal	supervision,	 lack	of	 information	and	modest	 labor	mobility	
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workers	 who	 work	 for	 informal	 firms	 within	 the	 underground	 economy	 tend	 to	 receive	
relatively	low	wage	and	loss	basic	non-wage	benefits	(Huong	et	al.	2013;	Rand	and	Tarp	2011).	
As	 a	 result,	 informal	 workers	 are	 extremely	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 shocks	 for	 examples	
unemployment,	health	problems,	aging	or	even	natural	disasters	in	the	existence	of	the	lack	
of	social	protection	(Huong	et	al.	2013).		
Because	differences	 in	non-wage	benefits	provided	 to	workers	between	 informal	 and	























reform	 as	 indicated	 in	 Panel	 C.	 The	 positive	 impact	 of	 exposure	 to	 the	 reform	 on	 the	
probability	to	have	a	formal	job	is	graphically	demonstrated	in	part	(a)	of	Figure	3.	The	finding	
in	this	section	is	that	Vietnamese	educated	workers	tend	to	work	in	the	formal	sector	with	a	
written	 employment	 contract	 is	 entirely	 consitent	 with	 the	 results	 from	 previous	 studies	










transformation	 of	 the	 Vietnamese	 economy	 from	 a	 traditional	 agriculture-based	 system	
towards	 a	 modern	 market-based	 economy	 with	 the	 considerable	 expansion	 of	 skilled	
occupations.	While	skilled	occupations	 include	managers,	professionals,	 technicians,	clerks	
and	 services	 and	 sales	 workers,	 unskilled	 occupations	 consist	 of	 craftsmen,	 machine	
operators,	manual	workers,	farming	workers	and	farmers.	Learning	process	equips	individuals	




Furthermore,	 the	 qualification	 preference	 has	 traditionally	 become	 a	 cultural	 setting	




laborers	 is	more	 obvious	when	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 proficient	 human	 resources	 in	 Vietnam	
(Montague	2013).		
Skilled	 occupations	 provide	 workers	 with	 improved	 working	 conditions	 and	 better	


















Ownership	 might	 affects	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	 firm	 provides	 non-wage	 benefits	 for	 its	
employees.	 For	 example,	 Nguyen	 and	 Ramstetter	 (2017)	 find	 that	 ownership	 structure	
contributes	 to	 wage	 differentials	 among	 workers	 who	 work	 for	 manufacturing	 firms	 in	
Vietnam.	Nguyen	and	Ramstetter	show	that	foreign	companies,	and	stated-owned	and	large	
firms	 tends	 to	 pay	 a	 higher	wage	 than	 small-sized	 domestic	 enterprises	 in	 this	 emerging	




This	 study	 defines	 employee-friendly	 firms	 as	 firms	 that	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 provide	
improved	working	 conditions	 for	workers	 and	more	 importantly	 are	 to	provide	non-wage	





















non-wage	 compensation	 in	 Vietnam.	 The	 estimates	 indicate	 that	 more	 schooling	 has	 a	
significant	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 probability	 to	 gain	 non-wage	 compensation	 specifically	
measured	by	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays,	monetary	employee	benefits,	annual	
paid	leave	and	firm-provided	social	insurance.		
Equally	 important,	 this	 paper	 also	 probes	 three	 causal	 pathways	 linking	 changes	 in	
schooling	 with	 the	 probability	 to	 gain	 non-wage	 benefits	 in	 the	 labor	 markets	 using	 the	
context	of	a	developing	country.		In	the	first	channel,	education	promotes	the	likelihood	for	
workers	 to	 reach	 formal	 jobs	 that	 in	 turn	 tend	 to	provide	better	non-wage	compensation	
relative	to	informal	jobs.	Another	pathway	is	that	the	role	of	skilled	occupation	through	which	
education	affects	non-wage	compensation.	The	more	educated	 is	 likely	 to	working	with	a	
skilled	occupation	and	by	this	link	he	or	she	gains	better	non-wage	benefits	compared	to	the	


















labor	 markets	 are	 seemingly	 failure	 to	 protect	 workers	 from	 disadvantaged	 working	
conditions	including	the	sufficient	provision	of	fundamental	non-wage	facilities	because	of	a	





Furthermore,	 some	 researchers	 recently	 attempt	 to	 examine	 the	 differences	 in	 the	
provision	of	non-wage	forms	of	compensation	in	the	workplace	from	developing	countries.	
There	are	some	factors	for	explaining	this	fact	 including	managers’	gender	(Rand	and	Tarp	
2011)	or	 the	probability	of	a	 firm	being	 registered	especially	 for	 small-	 and	medium-sized	
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Variable	 Full	sample	 	 Treatment	 	 Control	
Mean	 SD	 	 Mean	 SD	 	 Mean	 SD	
Non-wage	compensation	variables	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	(=1	if	yes,	=0	
otherwise)	
0.707	 0.455	 	 0.747	 0.435	 	 0.646	 0.478	
Monetary	employee	benefits	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.542	 0.498	 	 0.574	 0.494	 	 0.495	 0.500	
Annual	paid	leave	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.565	 0.496	 	 0.613	 0.487	 	 0.493	 0.500	
Firm-provided	social	insurance	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.547	 0.498	 	 0.592	 0.492	 	 0.480	 0.500	
Control	variables	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Age	(years)	 34.243	 5.446	 	 30.525	 2.996	 	 39.746	 3.087	
Male	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.567	 0.495	 	 0.553	 0.497	 	 0.589	 0.492	
Urban	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.536	 0.499	 	 0.513	 0.500	 	 0.570	 0.495	
Majority	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.949	 0.219	 	 0.951	 0.215	 	 0.946	 0.225	
Married	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.796	 0.403	 	 0.738	 0.440	 	 0.883	 0.321	
Red	river	delta	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.216	 0.412	 	 0.232	 0.422	 	 0.192	 0.394	
Midlands	and	northern	mountainous	areas	(=1	if	yes,	=0	
otherwise)	
0.092	 0.289	 	 0.097	 0.296	 	 0.085	 0.279	
Northern	and	coastal	central	region	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.201	 0.401	 	 0.195	 0.396	 	 0.211	 0.408	
Central	highlands	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.044	 0.206	 	 0.041	 0.198	 	 0.050	 0.217	
Southeastern	area	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.232	 0.422	 	 0.231	 0.422	 	 0.233	 0.423	
Mekong	river	delta	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.214	 0.410	 	 0.204	 0.403	 	 0.230	 0.421	
Survey	2010	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.338	 0.473	 	 0.342	 0.474	 	 0.331	 0.471	
Survey	2012	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.340	 0.474	 	 0.332	 0.471	 	 0.350	 0.477	
Survey	2014	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.323	 0.468	 	 0.326	 0.469	 	 0.319	 0.466	
Mechanims		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Formal	employment	(=1	if	having	a	written	emloyment	
contract,	=0	otherwise)	










0.676	 0.468	 	 0.728	 0.445	 	 0.599	 0.490	
Schooling	variables	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Schooling	reform	exposure	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.597	 0.491	 	 1	 0	 	 0	 0	
Schooling	years	(years)	 10.575	 4.264	 	 11.252	 3.849	 	 9.572	 4.637	














































































Controls	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Observations	 7,865	 	 7,865	 	 7,865	 	 7,865	













	 Annual	paid	leave	 	 Firm-provided	social	
insurance	










































































Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	


































































































































F-stat	on	excluded	instrument	 71.47	 	 71.47	 	 71.47	 	 71.47	
Bandwidth:	1970–1983	
(Observations:	6,038)	



















































































































































































Controls	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	



































































































Controls	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Observations	 6,495	 	 6,495	 	 6,495	 	 6,495	
Notes:	 ***p	 <	0.01,	**p	 <	0.05,	*p	 <	0.1.	Robust	 standard	errors	are	 clustered	at	 the	provincial	 level	 and	
reported	in	parenthesis.	Control	variables	consist	of	age,	squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	and	married.	The	













































































Controls	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Observations	 7,865	 	 7,865	 	 7,865	
Notes:	***p	<	0.01,	**p	<	0.05,	*p	<	0.1.	Robust	standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	provincial	level	
and	reported	in	parenthesis.	Control	variables	consist	of	age,	squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	and	
married.	Bandwidth:	1968–1985.		
Source:	author'	calculations	based	on	Vietnam	Household	Living	Standards	Survey	2010,	2012	and	
2014.	
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Fig.	1	 First-stage:	Schooling	reform	exposure	–	Schooling	years	
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Fig.	2	 Reduced-form:	Schooling	reform	exposure	–	Non-wage	compensation	
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Fig.	3	Reduced-form:	Schooling	reform	exposure	–	Formal	employment,	skilled	occupation	and	employee-friendly	firm	
	
	
	
	
	
